The War in Ira: Redefining and Refocusing

[Mike AI]

This is a newsletter I subscribe to. It is from a non-partisan ( albeit hawkish) think tank that specilizes in Foreign Policy and National Security. This is worth a read.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
> 05 March 2004
>
> The War in Iraq: Redefining and Refocusing
>
> Summary
>
> The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
> war in Iraq is reshaping itself, and that is redefining the
> entire conflict -- and returning attention to Saudi Arabia.
>
> Analysis
>
> The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
> war in Iraq is reshaping itself -- and that is redefining the
> broader war. There are two aspects of this. The rate at which the
> United States is incurring casualties in Iraq has declined
> dramatically during the past month. One American died on March 2;
> the last American deaths before that occurred Feb. 19. The tempo
> of attacks on U.S. forces has declined, although not as
> dramatically as the number of casualties. This indicates that the
> guerrilla forces focused on U.S. troops have declined in both
> number and quality.
>
> The primary focus of guerrilla operations no longer seems to be
> U.S. forces. The focus appears to be on Iraqis who collaborate
> with the United States, and, more generally, on the Shiite
> community. The Shia did not rise against the U.S. occupation and
> have worked with the United States to facilitate a transfer of
> power that will make them the dominant force in Iraq --
> reflecting the fact that the Shia are 60 percent of the
> population. Attacks on the Shia were signaled early last month
> when a CD-ROM written by top al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
> was captured by U.S. forces. The document on the CD-ROM indicated
> a change in strategy, at least by the jihadist guerrilla faction,
> away from the United States and toward the Shiite community.
>
> The synchronized attacks on Shiite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala
> that killed at least 170 people and injured hundreds more on
> March 2 -- Ashoura, a major religious occasion in Shiite Islam --
> manifested this shift.
>
> The guerrilla movement is split between the remnants of the
> Baathist government and foreign jihadists who entered Iraq to
> fight the United States. The two factions are different
> ideologically and operationally. Ideologically, the Baathists are
> secular and the jihadists are religious. Operationally, the
> Baathists have focused on what might be called conventional
> guerrilla warfare, concentrating on small-unit engagements with
> American forces. The jihadists engage more in classical militant
> operations against softer targets, in particular using suicide
> bombers.
>
> Since December 2003, we have been noting a decline in Baathist
> operational capabilities. The decline has not been a straight
> line down by any means, but it is now an undeniable reality. They
> are certainly not what they were during the Ramadan offensive in
> November 2003. Indeed, that offensive will probably be regarded
> as their high-water mark. As the Baathist capabilities have
> contracted, the relative significance of the jihadists has
> increased. It appears that their numbers have risen, but that
> might well be an illusion created by the decline of the
> Baathists.
>
> The leader of the jihadists appears to be al-Zarqawi, who has
> made a fundamental strategic decision. First, it is clear that he
> does not believe that the United States can be defeated by a
> guerrilla war. Although that might have appeared conceivable
> during the summer and fall of 2003, the failure of the Baathist
> offensive, the redeployment of U.S. forces, the improvement in
> U.S. intelligence and shifts in U.S. tactics have made American
> forces impervious to guerrilla attacks. In effect, the United
> States has won that campaign, and al-Zarqawi knows it.
>
> Following from this first point, al-Zarqawi appears to have
> reached a second conclusion: The primary cause of the failure of
> the guerrilla war lies with Iraq's Shiite community. Had the Shia
> acted in concert with the Sunnis, the U.S. position in Iraq would
> have become untenable last fall. The guerrilla war in the Sunni
> Triangle -- coupled with an intifada in the Shiite regions --
> would have made continued American occupation of Iraq impossible.
> If the United States had not withdrawn, it would have had to pull
> its forces back into small, well-defended enclaves with minimal
> control over the countryside. The situation would have resembled
> Afghanistan.
>
> Al-Zarqawi's analysis of what would have happened had there been
> a violent uprising south of Baghdad is not at all unreasonable.
> The United States did not have sufficient forces to suppress a
> nationwide insurrection, nor did its political requirements
> permit using an Israeli model for confronting an intifada and a
> guerrilla war. The consequences of a Shiite rising would have
> presented a grave problem for the United States.
>
> The rising did not occur, and -- from al-Zarqawi's point of view
> -- this has redefined the war. For him, the problem is not the
> Americans. They could have been defeated if the Shia had only
> played the appropriate role. But the Shia did not play their
> role, and thereby saved the Americans. Therefore, the Shia are
> the real enemy. In effect, the traditional fault line in the
> Islamic world between Sunni and Shia has opened up. To be more
> precise, the jihadists now see the key to victory in Iraq as
> being a war against the Shia that either shatters them, or --
> ideally -- forces them to change course and fall in behind the
> jihadists. If that were to happen, the United States would be
> defeated.
>
> It is not at all clear that al-Zarqawi can succeed in his
> mission. His support within the Iraqi Sunni community is not
> overwhelming, particularly among Sunni leaders. Moreover, the
> assumption that the Sunnis could win a showdown with the Shia is
> doubtful. Finally, the United States is still in Iraq and clearly
> is siding with the Shia against the jihadists. The jihadists can
> launch the kinds of attacks they did this week, but the net
> result is not likely to be either capitulation by the Shia or a
> change of course. The likely result will be that al-Zarqawi will
> find himself trapped between the Sunni elite, the Shia and the
> United States -- a very tough place to be. Al-Zarqawi is not
> going to win his point in Iraq.
>
> Iran and the Islamic World
>
> Still, his analysis applies to the broader Islamic world. The
> Iraqi Shia did not rise against the Americans for two reasons.
> First, they did not want to do anything that might result in a
> Sunni government in Iraq. They had their fill of that under
> Saddam Hussein. Second -- and this is more important -- the
> Iranians who had helped organize and define the Iraqi Shiite
> community had their own strategic interests. Iran wanted Iraq
> either neutralized or turned into a protectorate of Iran. Iraq
> was Iran's historical enemy, and the American problems in Iraq
> gave the Iranians the opportunity they needed to redefine the
> geopolitical status of Iraq -- a fundamental national interest
> for Iran.
>
> The Iranians were more concerned with pursuing their national
> interests than their ideological and religious principles. They
> were confronted with the choice of siding with their Islamic --
> albeit Sunni -- brothers and driving the United States out of
> Iraq, or siding with the United States against the Sunnis. They
> decided to side with the United States. Their national interest
> superseded their religious interests, or possibly they felt so
> estranged from the Sunnis that they did not see a common
> religious bond. Either way, the Iranians decided it was in their
> interest not to drive the Americans out.
>
> In the broader Islamic context, Iran is aligning with the United
> States. This makes the U.S. position in the region impregnable --
> or as close to it as possible. It also means that Saudi Arabia,
> some of whose key subjects had been instrumental in financing al
> Qaeda without significant interference from the Saudi state, is
> now in very deep trouble. Regardless of antipathy between the
> jihadists, including al Qaeda, and the Saudi government, Saudi
> Arabia's problems affect them.
>
> If the Islamic world is going to be torn by Sunni-Shiite strife,
> then it needs to be remembered that, while the Shia are a small
> minority in the Islamic world taken as a whole, they are a
> powerful force -- and represent the majority population -- in the
> Persian Gulf. For example, the Saudi oil fields are in a Shiite-
> dominated region of Saudi Arabia. The entente between the United
> States and Iran makes Iran enormously powerful in the Persian
> Gulf region, both as the most powerful indigenous military force
> and because of its ties to Shia throughout the region. As Iranian
> domination of Iraq increases through a Shiite government there,
> Saudi vulnerability increases dramatically.
>
> In any generalized conflict between Sunnis and Shia, the Saudis
> are vulnerable to both direct military action from Iran and
> indirect subversion from their own Shiite population. Facing an
> internal challenge from jihadists, the Saudis can quickly find
> themselves trapped between the conservatives and the Iranian-
> backed Shia. The conservatives might decide that the territorial
> integrity of Saudi Arabia is of less importance than the
> purification of the House of Saud, while the Iranians might view
> the rise of a more extremist government in Riyadh as worth the
> price of dominating Saudi oil fields. In other words, the Sunni-
> Shiite confrontation could dramatically redraw the map of the
> region.
>
> The United States is, of course, the catalyst for all of this.
> Its original intention was the unilateral governance of Iraq. The
> guerrilla war created a dependency on the Shiites -- and on Iran
> -- that runs counter to the original plan. At the same time, the
> Iranian decision to underwrite U.S. presence in Iraq in exchange
> for a long-term strategic advantage did more than simply save the
> day for the Americans. It set in motion a potential conflict
> between Sunnis and Shia that has two possible benefits. The first
> is to divert the attention of jihadists from the United States to
> the Shia. The second is to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia even
> further, forcing the Saudis to look again to the United States as
> the guarantor of their national security.
>
> Obviously, neither Sunnis nor Shia want the United States to reap
> the rewards of their conflict. Sunni and Shiite leaders in Iraq
> have worked vigorously in the past few days to present a united
> front against al-Zarqawi. In the broader war, a letter from al
> Qaeda, which appears to be authentic, stated that al Qaeda was
> neither involved in the bombings of Shia in Iraq, nor did it
> approve of them. On the other hand, the letter did refer to the
> Shia as infidels, which drives home the point: Al Qaeda does not
> want to benefit the United States, but its hostility toward the
> Shia runs deep. A confrontation with the Shia, in the end, could
> prove irresistible.
>
> We have long discussed the growing U.S.-Iranian entente. Now that
> it is here, it has generated the inevitable jihadist response.
> The most important question in the next few weeks will be whether
> the jihadist attacks on the Shia in Iraq -- and elsewhere, such
> as in Pakistan and Lebanon -- will resonate among the Sunni
> masses. At the moment, it does not seem to be working, but the
> situation is volatile. Moreover, the Sunnis in Iraq might not
> respond, but if Sunnis in other countries do respond and begin
> attacking Shia, the conflict could spread dramatically and
> quickly.
>
> The U.S. Dilemma
>
> There are two problems for the United States. The first is that
> its dependency on the Iranians and the Shia could rapidly trap
> them in unpleasant ways. The United States could quickly become
> hostage to Iranian geopolitical dreams. Second, it follows that
> the United States must work quickly to establish a balance of
> power in the region. The traditional balance is between Iran and
> Iraq. Whatever was promised Iran, if the Iraqi Shia can be
> convinced that they have a national interest separate from their
> religious interests, Iraq could become a counterweight. There is
> tension between An Najaf, the seat of Iraqi Shia, and Qom, Iran's
> religious capital. It is not clear that that tension is enough to
> hang a strategy on, but the United States must find a way to
> contain Iranian ambitions before the solution becomes the
> problem.
>
> If the United States is going to be the counterweight, then it
> needs a geographical base to build on. Iraq can serve as a base
> only if there is a broader regional framework into which it is
> integrated. That means that two countries become vital to the
> United States again: Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Turks, in the
> end, have too many common interests with the United States not to
> cooperate. It is the Saudis who become the real focus of
> attention.
>
> The Saudis have consistently miscalculated since Sept. 11. As a
> result, they are moving into their worst nightmare: a domestic
> insurrection, rising Shiite power and a hostile United States.
> From the standpoint of Riyadh, things can't get much worse. The
> Saudis have three choices. They can ally with the jihadists, and
> face the United States and Iran together -- not a good idea. They
> can try to make a deal with Iran and face the jihadists and the
> Americans -- an even worse idea. Or they can turn back to the
> United States and use American power to crush the jihadists at
> home and serve as a shield against Iran -- not a great choice,
> but the best of a bad lot. It is the choice they will have to
> make.
>
> That will mean the Saudis not only will shut down all financial
> support for al Qaeda, but also will give the United States direct
> access to Saudi intelligence files -- without exception -- and
> access to Saudi nationals who are working with al Qaeda. That
> will be the American price for any deal. If the Saudis make that
> deal, al Qaeda will become much more visible to the United States
> globally. It will mean the United States is likely to be in a
> position to liquidate al Qaeda.
>
> In the end, the United States can turn lemons into lemonade.
> Having miscalculated on the guerrilla war and having been forced
> to rely on the Shia and the Iranians, the United States -- if it
> is both nimble and implacable -- can wind up running the table.
> We are in a new phase of the war, and eyes are now turning back
> to the original target: Saudi Arabia.
>

[RawAlex]

Mike, Non partisan? Are you joking?

The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
> war in Iraq is reshaping itself -- and that is redefining the
> broader war. There are two aspects of this. The rate at which the
> United States is incurring casualties in Iraq has declined
> dramatically during the past month.

This is using the most standard lien from the boy, that Iraq is part of the 9-11 situation. From there on out, the rest of it is tainted by making the error of assuming the war on terror (is that like the war on drugs?) is the same as the Iraq war.

The rest of it is the rest of it. By starting with a flawed premise, the rest of it doesn't play well.

Alex

[Mike AI]

Originally posted by RawAlex@Mar 7 2004, 06:10 PM
Mike, Non partisan? Are you joking?

This is using the most standard lien from the boy, that Iraq is part of the 9-11 situation. From there on out, the rest of it is tainted by making the error of assuming the war on terror (is that like the war on drugs?) is the same as the Iraq war.

The rest of it is the rest of it. By starting with a flawed premise, the rest of it doesn't play well.

Alex

Alex you continue to show yourself as the vilalge idiot.

I will try to explain again for you, try to read slowly.

1) War in Iraq was done to put pressure on Saudi Arabia. This is the real reason, the WMD, and butcher of baghdad was for the public.
2) We are putting pressure on Saudi Arabia because they are the real money and support of Al Quada/
3) Saudi Arabia was kicking out military out of thir country.
4) War in Iraq can elimiate a bad guy, can be sold to American public, and gives the US a military base to operate in a region of the world of vital interest.
5) Stabilization of Iraq can lead to stabilization of the region.
6) US can put over and covert and political pressure on Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria ( the whole gulf) from Iraq.


Anyone who thinks the war for Iraq was for anything other then RealPolitik is clueless. Living in a democracy that is not agressive or war loving, the war has to be sold on other issues ( All LEGITIMATE ISSUES, but not the real reason).

The American public finds it distastful to deal in the realities of National Intersts. We prefer to fight for noble reasons. Look at our history, President's and politicans have always framed the wars we were invovled with as Right vs Wrong, demonizing the enemy, etc...

I doubt this will help you Alex, you are so consumed with a narrow minded hatefulness of anything that has to do with REpublicans you cannot see the bigger picture.

I would not care if the President was Bush, Clinton, Reagan, Carter, Kennedy or anyone else. The geo-political reasons for going into Iraq were solid.

Many Americnas might not want to hear the reality of it, but if all oil exports from the middle east stopped over night the US would collapse.

The US's power comes not from its military but from its economy. Our economy is tied directly to oil. It is the fuel that runs everything. No President would allow this to happen. Be thankful as a Canadian you get all the benefits of this without having to do any of the heavy lifting!

The best part of this is that 9-11 allowed Bush to change the entire middle east, and justify all the things we need to do to secure our National Interests. In retrospect it was the worst thing Al Quada could have done. History will determine this I guess.

But 20-30-50 years from now, if through this time oil continues to flow cheaply, the region is stabilizes, historians will judge all of this to be a HUGE success.... on par with winning WWII and the Cold War!

[Mike AI]

Oh and Alex if you think they are that wrong - stop by their sites and drop them an e-mail. http://www.stratfor.com/corporate/static_index.neo

I am sure all the PHD, Professors, and other Foreign Policy professionals would love to hear your feedback and deep analysis!

[RawAlex]

Mike, ready what I quoted. What did they say? War in Iraq is part of the war on Terror.

What did I miss from that?

I didn't comment on the rest of their stuff, except to say that by starting with a flawed assumption of fact, the rest is speculation at it's finest.

Let's line up all the people who said Saddam had piles of WMD, and see how many of them had PHDs and such... then tell me how much that paper gets ya.

Alex

[Meni]

anyone watching 60 minutes
with that iraqi I am a MORON,
who supposedly fed the US bullshit about WMD
he's smart, he's got his boys over in Iraq sneaking around getting info
he's getting $350K a month
oh boy whats the rate in Iraq to get someone to listen up?
$4 a day?

so Bush will blame the CIA, CIA blames this guy
but we still got him on payroll

hey and about Bush being such a hero going to war
where the fuck was he during Vietnam?

[Winetalk.com]

Originally posted by Meni@Mar 7 2004, 07:17 PM
anyone watching 60 minutes
with that iraqi I am a MORON,
who supposedly fed the US bullshit about WMD
he's smart, he's got his boys over in Iraq sneaking around getting info
he's getting $350K a month
oh boy whats the rate in Iraq to get someone to listen up?
$4 a day?

so Bush will blame the CIA, CIA blames this guy
but we still got him on payroll

hey and about Bush being such a hero going to war
where the fuck was he during Vietnam?

Holy Shit!
Even I was somewhere during the Vietnam war!

[PornoDoggy]

Originally posted by Serge_Oprano+Mar 7 2004, 07:29 PM-->