Anyone still read Debka?

[Mike AI]

http://debka.com/article.php?aid=591

Of course I am sure PD would say there are no syrians in iraq. Syria is no direct threat to us, blah blah blah. We should be spanking syria's ASS!! Not necessarily doing an Iraq on them, but rather bombing runs, covert interdiction, etc....

[PornoDoggy]

Mike ... are you really an idiot, or do you just play one on Oprano?

What possible basis do you have for saying I would deny that there are Syrians in Iraq? Did it come from the same region of your ass you pulled that "secretly hoping for the success of Osama" crap yesterday?

I don't dispute that there are morons on the left who are naive enough to make that denial - but I ain't one of them. Now maybe you think I'm lying, or maybe the idea that one can not think the lone cowboy approach of your beloved Bush is the right way to fight the war is just too complex for your brain to handle. Since you are an admitted dittohead, I have my own suspicions, but that's not really important. There are just as many morons on the right as there are on the left.

If you think I would give a rat's ass about the survival of the Syrian regime, you really are dumb. If you ask me if we need another nationbuilding project at the moment - considering we've got two that are far from a stable beginning - well, that's an entire different question.

And by the way ... Syria WASN'T a direct threat to the United States until we took over Iraq. That's not to say that they were our friends, or that they aren't an ongoing threat to a U.S. ally.

[Mike AI]

Originally posted by PornoDoggy@Oct 16 2003, 10:36 PM
Mike ... are you really an idiot, or do you just play one on Oprano?

What possible basis do you have for saying I would deny that there are Syrians in Iraq? Did it come from the same region of your ass you pulled that "secretly hoping for the success of Osama" crap yesterday?

I don't dispute that there are morons on the left who are naive enough to make that denial - but I ain't one of them. Now maybe you think I'm lying, or maybe the idea that one can not think the lone cowboy approach of your beloved Bush is the right way to fight the war is just too complex for your brain to handle. Since you are an admitted dittohead, I have my own suspicions, but that's not really important. There are just as many morons on the right as there are on the left.

If you think I would give a rat's ass about the survival of the Syrian regime, you really are dumb. If you ask me if we need another nationbuilding project at the moment - considering we've got two that are far from a stable beginning - well, that's an entire different question.

And by the way ... Syria WASN'T a direct threat to the United States until we took over Iraq. That's not to say that they were our friends, or that they aren't an ongoing threat to a U.S. ally.


So you would support Bush for spanking Syria a little, enough to get them to co-operate? If not we take them out?

[PornoDoggy]

Take them out? How about we settle Iraq down a bit, and maybe work on Afghanistan - remember Afghanistan? - some more, before we take on another project.

Bush already spanked Syria a little - or allowed them to be spanked. Will it produce REAL results? I doubt it. As unpleasant (or as unmacho) as it may sound, what I think we need to do right now is keep the pressure on them right now to minimize the damage they can do while we attempt to stabalize Iraq.

It is a situation that needs to be dealt with. As to whether it's up to us alone to do it, or when we need to do it - those are questions for legitimate debate. As hard as this may be for you to understand, people who hold opinions different than yours don't necessarilly have the interests of the Sryian regime in mind, nor are they naive enough to believe they are not a source of trouble. It could just be that they think we have enough on our hands.

[Mike AI]

Originally posted by PornoDoggy@Oct 16 2003, 11:44 PM
Take them out? How about we settle Iraq down a bit, and maybe work on Afghanistan - remember Afghanistan? - some more, before we take on another project.

Bush already spanked Syria a little - or allowed them to be spanked. Will it produce REAL results? I doubt it. As unpleasant (or as unmacho) as it may sound, what I think we need to do right now is keep the pressure on them right now to minimize the damage they can do while we attempt to stabalize Iraq.

It is a situation that needs to be dealt with. As to whether it's up to us alone to do it, or when we need to do it - those are questions for legitimate debate. As hard as this may be for you to understand, people who hold opinions different than yours don't necessarilly have the interests of the Sryian regime in mind, nor are they naive enough to believe they are not a source of trouble. It could just be that they think we have enough on our hands.


HAHA Why did this answer not surprise me.

Part of the problem we are having in Iraq is directly due to Syria....

I bet you were against bombing the Chinese during Korea.... and N. Vietnam during that conflict!

There should be NOWHERE on this planet where our enemies are safe... especially enemies who are actively working against us in Military operations.

[PornoDoggy]

I happen to think Truman made the right decision in Korea - well, except that McArthur should have been treated the same way a PFC would have been if he'd disobeyed a direct order, or any junior Captain caught lying to his superiors to cover up doing a piss-poor job. There are a lot of reasons I think that, most of them have to do with Europe. If things spun too far out of control we could have had the Iron Curtain ending on the Atlantic.

Vietnam was a horse of a different color entirely. Bombing made sense up to about the time, say, that we equalled the tonnage dropped in Eurpoe during WWII. Somewhere shorty after that somebody should have been able to conclude that it wasn't accomplishing what we wanted it to do.

And the most important reason I'm hesitant to embark on an adventure in Syria, Mikey ... remember, there are a finite number of U.S. military personnel. If you commit more assets someplace like Syria, you could end up limiting your ability to respond someplace else - additional requirements in Iraq or Afghanistan, a flareup with North Korea, or who the hell knows what else. Now, I know that you will probably slide right by that since it doesn't fit in with your perception of my views, but at least I tried ...

[Mike AI]

Your answers do not surprise me. You are part of the crew that does not understand the concept of VICTORY. If we fight a war, we should do what it takes to win, outright, and as fast as possible.

[PornoDoggy]

I understand the concept of victory just fine ... I still say let's finish the two we are already in before we start another.

[Mike AI]

> 16 October 2003
>
> by Dr. George Friedman
>
> The Next Phase of the War
>
> Summary
>
> Washington is reformulating its war plans in Iraq -- something
> critics of the Bush administration might view as a sign of
> weakness. The real weakness lies not in that the United States is
> shifting strategies, but rather that it has taken so long to make
> adjustments. However, even with a new strategy, it is unclear
> whether the United States will succeed.
>
> Analysis
>
> The United States is in the process of reformulating its war
> plans in Iraq. Such reformulations are normal in war: Every
> successful war consists of layers of plans that are adjusted as
> opponents change their strategy and tactics and as lessons are
> learned. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the defeated party is
> the inability to redefine its strategy based on experience. The
> presence of only one plan is a sign of defeat: The French war
> plan in World War II never changed and, therefore, never worked;
> the Japanese, once their initial plan ran into trouble, could
> never generate a rational strategy. On the other hand, the United
> States went through multiple plans, developing and discarding
> strategies on all levels. This is insufficient to guarantee
> victory (the Germans also went through multiple plans), but it is
> one of the necessary conditions.
>
> Critics of the Bush administration, who see the need to change
> plans as a sign of weakness, simply don't understand war. In
> Iraq, where the administration should be criticized is not that
> it changed plans, but that it took so long to do so. For the
> United States, the most significant failure in this war has been
> the length of time it took to recognize that the reality on the
> ground in Iraq was not the reality Washington had expected -- and
> worse, the length of time it took U.S. leaders to think through
> their strategy. Changing plans is the sign of a healthy command
> structure; rigidly adhering to plans in the face of a changing
> reality is a sign of real problems.
>
> U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's problem was that he
> was unable to publicly confront the fact that the unexpected had
> happened in Iraq. He might have done so in private, but no shift
> in strategy emerged. From early May, when the guerrilla war was
> launched, until last week, Rumsfeld appeared to be strategically
> paralyzed. He neither had a plan for crushing the Iraqi
> guerrillas, nor did he seem able to conceptualize how the rest of
> the war would proceed. This should not, actually, be
> personalized: Even though Rumsfeld was both secretary of defense
> and the dominant personality in the strategic process, it was a
> failure of the civilian and military command structures in
> general.
>
> Rumsfeld has been adamant in arguing that there are no parallels
> between Iraq and Vietnam. He is correct in all but one sense: One
> of the fundamental failings in Vietnam was the inability of
> senior U.S. civilian and military commanders to recognize that,
> though individual operations were successful, they did not tie
> together into a strategy -- or more precisely, that the strategy
> was not working. This is why many Vietnam veterans are right in
> saying that they won the battles but lost the war. It is the job
> of the strategists to make certain that the battles and strategy
> mesh and, when they don't, to make adjustments. In Vietnam, the
> strategy never meshed with the operations. A similar situation
> has emerged in Iraq, save that the operations didn't add up
> either.
>
> These things happen. The measure of success is how quickly a
> problem is recognized and how quickly adjustments are made. If we
> read the creation of the Stabilization Group correctly, we are in
> the process of seeing those changes emerge. That means that about
> six months have elapsed between the start of the guerrilla war
> and the crafting of a response. That isn't great, but it isn't
> catastrophic either. The timeline is bearable, so long as the
> strategic shifts are effective.
>
> To consider this, we need to recall the two strategic reasons the
> United States had for invading Iraq -- as opposed to the public
> justifications:
>
> 1. Seizing the most strategic country in the region as a base of
> operations from which to mount follow-on operations against
> countries that collaborate or permit collaboration with al Qaeda.
> 2. Transforming the psychological perception of the United States
> in the Islamic world from a hated and impotent power to a hated
> but feared power.
>
> The most significant impact the guerrilla war has had on the
> United States concerns the second goal. The perception (as
> opposed to the reality) of the war is that the conventional
> forces of the occupying power were helpless in the face of the
> guerrillas. There was certainly truth to that, but only in this
> sense. The guerrilla movement has remained well below critical
> mass -- it in no way threatens either the occupation or the
> operational capabilities of the United States. Total casualties
> relative to the force are insignificant from a military point of
> view.
>
> Nevertheless, the fact that the movement could not be crushed --
> but continued to operate for months -- made it appear that the
> United States had become militarily trapped. The U.S. response
> compounded this perception: Rather than pressing forward with
> regional operations, the United States first tried to crush the
> guerrillas with search-and-destroy missions, and then seemed to
> halt offensive operations and simply take casualties. The result
> appeared to be paralysis, and this appearance undermined the
> second goal: It negated the psychological value of the fall of
> Baghdad.
>
> The solution for the United States rests in the first goal. The
> United States has seized control of Iraq and is capable of
> mounting political, covert and overt operations against
> neighboring countries. The guerrilla war, though irritating, does
> not undermine the United States' operational capability: First,
> the war is primarily confined to one region; second, the tempo of
> operations in that region does not constrain military operations.
>
> Therefore, the key is to use the military capabilities obtained
> through basing in Iraq and exploit the occupation, despite the
> guerrilla war. In a sense, the guerrilla war is irrelevant -- it
> will be there whatever the United States does, at least for a
> while. Whether the United States proceeds with exploitation
> operations or not, the war is a constant. There is no logical
> reason to halt operations.
>
> That appears to be just what is happening. The United States, for
> example, opened a psychological campaign against Syria the
> weekend of Oct. 11-12 by pointing out that the Israelis have
> submarine-, air- and land-based nuclear weapons. Two U.S.
> officials made the point in such a way that the Syrians couldn't
> miss it. This came just days after Turkish lawmakers voted to
> send troops into Iraq. Though those troops are important, the
> real importance of the vote was its declaration of belligerency
> by Turkey, which has moved from a neutral stance established in
> March back into active collaboration with the United States.
>
> The United States used the Turkish shift to create a massive
> coalition against Syria along most of its borders. With the
> Israelis, Turks and Americans all arrayed along its frontiers,
> Damascus has no choice but to reconsider its strategy. The
> alternative is to assume that the United States will be unwilling
> to use its forces -- and those of Israel -- to compel regime
> change in Syria. The Syrians might believe that to be the case,
> but the risk of error is too great.
>
> It is useful to examine Syrian behavior more closely. The Iraq
> campaign ended with U.S. forces dueling Syrian forces along the
> Syria-Iraq border. Damascus, clearly surprised by the U.S.
> victory, seemed to shift their policies in April and May,
> suppressing some Palestinian and Islamist activity within the
> country's borders. Then, as the guerrilla war intensified over
> the summer, Syria seemed to reconsider. Officials clearly
> perceived American weakness in Iraq and concluded that so long as
> the guerrilla war continued, the United States would be
> exceedingly cautious in expanding the conflict. Indeed, during
> the six months of U.S. absorption with the guerrilla war, the
> Syrian perception solidified into the view that the United States
> was trapped in Iraq in a war it could neither win nor exit. Syria
> permitted Palestinian and Islamist activity to resume,
> discounting the U.S. threat.
>
> Thus, the United States' failure to achieve its second strategic
> goal created a situation in which Syria drew judgments that were
> not warranted, since the United States had achieved the first
> goal. The United States was the dominant military power in the
> region; it simply wasn't perceived as militarily powerful. That
> perception was driven by the inability to stop the guerrillas.
> Therefore, the United States had to demonstrate that the
> guerrilla war did not weaken its ability to coerce its neighbors
> in the region.
>
> The United States appears to have decided to treat the guerrilla
> war as a military side show -- not insignificant, but certainly
> not militarily decisive. Given this, there is no reason for
> Washington to halt aggressive actions in the region to force
> change in behavior toward al Qaeda and associated groups. By
> doing this, the United States not only exploits the military
> advantage it has won, but also shifts back the psychological
> perception to something that more reasonably matches U.S.
> capabilities.
>
> Therefore, we expect to see more aggressive U.S. moves in the
> coming months. The situation facing the Syrians is a paradigm
> created by the U.S. strategy at this point: Washington is using a
> coalition of regional powers to put Syria in an untenable
> position. The Bush administration accepts the fact that the
> United States will be seen as collaborating with Israel -- under
> the valid theory that whatever the United States does, it will be
> seen as Israel's collaborator and therefore might as well enjoy
> the benefits of collaboration. Finally, Washington is using the
> real threat of action to create a situation in which Damascus
> either must comply with Washington's wishes or place a life-or-
> death bet that the United States will refrain from action.
>
> The Saudis at this point are not an issue for the United States,
> but Iran is. The United States is open to a deal with Iran, but
> the Iranian perception that the United States is desperate for a
> deal must be changed, from Washington's point of view. Iran, like
> Syria, has perceived the U.S. position in Iraq as causing
> strategic paralysis for Washington. That has made closing the
> deal with Tehran impossible. Iran's high expectations of what it
> would get from the deal kept rising as the sense of American
> vulnerability increased. Washington's intent is clearly to change
> that perception and reconfigure the negotiation process. The test
> case will be Iran's response to the International Atomic Energy
> Agency (IAEA) on its nuclear weapons program.
>
> The United States is now trying to accept the guerrilla war as a
> semi-permanent feature of its occupation of Iraq. It is trying to
> restart its strategic engines in spite of that reality. From a
> strictly military point of view, there is no reason why this
> can't happen. From a strategic point of view, it is a logical
> necessity. From a domestic point of view, the administration must
> demonstrate that Iraq was a means toward an end and not an end in
> itself. It must return to the strategic principles that drove the
> invasion.
>
> Many things can go wrong with this strategy -- and they might.
> All strategies are vulnerable to reality, expected and
> unexpected. The Syrians might not buckle and the United States
> might not have the ability to coerce them. The Iranians might
> trigger a massive rising among the Shiites that the United States
> cannot control. The guerrillas might increase their operations
> and become strategically significant. And most important,
> something totally unexpected might happen.
>
> The United States decided to climb aboard the tiger when it
> invaded Iraq. That is not a bad strategy; the problem is there is
> no safe way to climb off the tiger. For six months, the U.S.
> response to the unexpected guerrilla war was to hang onto the
> tiger and hope he would fall asleep. Hasn't happened. Won't
> happen. Being on the tiger's back leaves the United States only
> one option: Ride the tiger.
>
> It is interesting to note the paradox in Rumsfeld. Having been
> perceived as an enormously aggressively strategist, he turned out
> to be remarkably passive in the face of unexpected countermoves.
> This has happened to many strategic planners: Effective in
> planning a war, they become ineffective in dealing with the
> unplanned and unexpected. The most dangerous point in a war comes
> when the unexpected happens and the old plan must be thrown away
> and a new one devised on the fly. That's what happened in Iraq.
> The challenge facing the United States is defining a plan to deal
> with the unexpected and unwelcomed. If the United States succeeds
> in doing so -- and in a long war, it will have to do this over
> and over again -- it can succeed. If the United States behaves as
> France did in 1940 -- paralyzed by an opponent behaving
> unexpected -- the outcome can be grim.
>
> It is unclear whether the United States will succeed. The issue
> is not to deal with the guerrillas in Iraq, but to redefine the
> entire strategy of the war against al Qaeda -- to revive the link
> between the Iraq campaign and the effort to destroy the primary
> adversary. It appears to us that the United States now has begun
> to do that. However, it is unclear whether it will succeed. The
> first crisis of the war that began Sept. 11 is being addressed,
> but it is unclear whether it will be solved.
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[PornoDoggy]

I knew I should have renewed my subscription ... :)

[Mike AI]

Originally posted by PornoDoggy@Oct 17 2003, 11:24 AM
I knew I should have renewed my subscription ... :)


PD it is an interesting peice..... I am dissappointed in Rumsfield, but I am glad that others are making moves.